Qingdao Sigma Chemical Co., Ltd (International, US, EU, Canada and Australia domestic

Government learned how to track TOR a long time ago. They started injecting 'delay signatures' at exit nodes and correlate it to traffic at other nodes.
For example, your traffic gets 10ms delay for first packet, 33ms for second, 25ms for third etc. The numbers are unique for each investigation target. The sequence is low enough you don't notice it, but is consistent, so it's easy for them to identify you as a target of their investigation at TOR on-ramp node.

The only reason government doesn't knock on your door is because you are not high enough priority for them. TOR doesn't protect you from surveillance if they really want to go after you. It's a matter of prioritizing their resources.
Use a no logs vpn, paid by cash before tor. problem solved
 
If the VPN is outside of Uncle Sam's reach - sure. Otherwise they can still request Lawful Intercept. If you are important enough, under FISA in the US, so your VPN and Internet providers can't tell you about it.
 
Government learned how to track TOR a long time ago. They started injecting 'delay signatures' at exit nodes and correlate it to traffic at other nodes.
For example, your traffic gets 10ms delay for first packet, 33ms for second, 25ms for third etc. The numbers are unique for each investigation target. The sequence is low enough you don't notice it, but is consistent, so it's easy for them to identify you as a target of their investigation at TOR on-ramp node.

The only reason government doesn't knock on your door is because you are not high enough priority for them. TOR doesn't protect you from surveillance if they really want to go after you. It's a matter of prioritizing their resources.
That works if they control the majority of nodes, and that's why guard nodes have been a thing for a while, so your entry node is more static, and the intermediate and exit nodes are random.

Suppose the attacker controls, or can observe, C relays. Suppose there are N relays total. If you select new entry and exit relays each time you use the network, the attacker will be able to correlate all traffic you send with probability around (c/n)^2.

With guard nodes the user has some chance (on the order of (n-c)/n) of avoiding profiling.
 
It's possible CBP cracked open that vial and tested it. No fent, no problem.
Very likely. All Western customs agencies (& many other LE agencies) possess “Raman scanners” - available as handheld devices, they can just point it at something & within a few seconds it’ll tell them exactly what the substance is. It’s not new tech, it’s been around & in operational use for quite a few years.
 
Bottom line is.. it's really hard to hide from the government surveillance even if you are very technical. No chance if you are not technical. CALEA forced all equipment vendors implement Lawful Intercept capabilities.



You can remain anonymous only as long as you are not important enough.

Government is known to install backdoors in encryption algorithms.

Your VPN provider may not cooperate, but the three letter agency still has the keys to your traffic. They will not use it as evidence in the court, you are too small of a fish to blow their sources, but they can definitely see a lot more than they admit.
 
Bottom line is.. it's really hard to hide from the government surveillance even if you are very technical. No chance if you are not technical. CALEA forced all equipment vendors implement Lawful Intercept capabilities.



You can remain anonymous only as long as you are not important enough.

Government is known to install backdoors in encryption algorithms.

Your VPN provider may not cooperate, but the three letter agency still has the keys to your traffic. They will not use it as evidence in the court, you are too small of a fish to blow their sources, but they can definitely see a lot more than they admit.

Exactly, and the public doesn't become aware of new capabilities until there's a case big enough to allow the info to slip.

Hell, I don't care if they know what I'm up to, as long as I know it's not something they're concerned enough to come after me for.

Most of my friends who are huge on opsec aren't doing anything that warrants all the complexity of trying to avoid surveillance. (some seem to think they are, the "OMG 1 vial of test for TRT better set up a drop house, coinwasher, vpn" types).

Security through obscurity.
 
Rule of a thumb with QSC - use different weights/different amount of kits per product per order. This way you have another way to identify the products and double check info from your rep - if they make a mistake, the most you'll get is 'sorry'. That may not be sufficient for impact on your health/body
 
I have ordered some raws from the international warehouse, and among them tadalafil, and look at the SKUs.
Seems like a joke, anyone else in this situation?
Numbering bags of raws is normal for QSC. It's too late now but what I have done in the past is once I get my tracking I ask them what numbers correlate to what products then they just email you saying number 1 is this and number 2 is that etc. normally you could just email the same rep you did the transaction with and they would just give you that information but because they're dark right now you're just going to have to wait.
 
I doubt protecting customer data is a priority for QSC, On the other hand, I doubt the Chinese have any reason to hand that over to the US,
True …. But QSC & Tracy are separate entities & it’s all but certain that Tracy is in Europe, not China.

Not a concern for anyone buying personal use amounts, but if you’re reselling, it might be worth considering that it absolutely would be in Tracy’s best interest to maintain a list of his best customers (ie those buying for resale) that can be handed over to European LE as part of a plea deal should he ever be busted.
 
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