trynagains
Member
Since my last thread on privacy got so much attention I decided to write another one. Purely out of the kindness of my heart I will spoonfeed you gearheads some cybersecurity wisdom. This is a short guide for two decent security focused operating systems. Maybe this time I’ll get 10 readers. Honestly I don’t really care. If this helps a small handful of people it’s worth it to me. And if anyone wants me to do a deep dive on any security topic I might be willing if you’re not an asshole. Anyways let’s get to it.
If you’re reading this because you think anonymity can be achieved by installing the right OS and then going back to business as usual, stop now. That mindset is how people get burned. Anonymity tools exist because modern computing is hostile by default and because users lie to themselves about how careful they are. These systems are built on the assumption that the network is watching, the software is compromised until proven otherwise, and eventually you—or someone else—will fuck up. Installation and usage matter because most failures don’t happen during some Hollywood-tier hack, they happen during setup, updates, or the moment someone gets comfortable and starts cutting corners.
Tails OS
Tails is disposable by design, and you should treat it like a burner, not a home. You download the image from the official site, follow the instructions, you verify the signature because skipping verification is how you start the whole process already screwed, and you write it to a USB stick using the recommended installer. You don’t dual-boot it, you don’t install it to your internal drive, and you don’t reuse the same USB for years like it has sentimental value. When you boot, you boot directly into Tails, connect through the Tor connection assistant, and you wait until Tor is fully up before doing anything. You use the Tor Browser exactly as shipped. No random extensions, no resizing windows, no logging into anything tied to your real life because you “just needed to check something real quick.” If you enable persistent storage, you do it reluctantly and minimally, understanding that persistence is a crack in the whole amnesic model. When you’re done, you shut the system down properly and let it wipe memory. No suspend, no hibernate, no clever workarounds. Tails is not a daily driver, and the moment you try to turn it into one, you’re already using it wrong.
Qubes OS with whonix
Qubes with Whonix is for people who assume everything is hostile and want that hostility contained instead of ignored. Installation starts with hardware that actually supports it, meaning proper virtualization support and enough RAM that you’re not constantly fighting the OS. You install Qubes directly on bare metal and accept that it owns the machine completely. During setup, you enable the default Whonix components so you get a Tor gateway and workstation templates from the start. After first boot, you do not immediately jump into real activity. You learn how qubes work first, because misunderstanding how copy-paste, file transfers, and networking boundaries behave is how people quietly defeat Qubes while feeling smug about it. For anonymous activity, you create AppVMs based on the Whonix workstation template and ensure their networking is routed exclusively through the Whonix gateway qube. You do not mix anonymous and non-anonymous work in the same qube, you do not share clipboards casually, and you do not tell yourself “this one exception won’t matter.” That’s how identities bleed together. You keep separate networking qubes for non-anonymous traffic so the separation is enforced by the OS, not by your memory or self-control. You update templates regularly, because stale templates rot your security assumptions, and you treat USB devices like the malware delivery systems they often are by using dedicated USB qubes. Qubes gives you brutal, unforgiving isolation if you respect it. The second you start collapsing boundaries for convenience, you’ve turned a serious security platform into a very expensive placebo.
None of this protects you from acting like yourself online, reusing identifiers, logging into personal accounts, leaking behavioral patterns over time, or being observed in the real world. Most deanonymization doesn’t happen because Tor failed or virtualization broke, it happens because people get lazy, impatient, or overconfident. These tools remove a lot of easy ways to fuck yourself, but they don’t remove responsibility. They buy you margin, not immunity, and if you forget that, the tools won’t save you.
If you’re reading this because you think anonymity can be achieved by installing the right OS and then going back to business as usual, stop now. That mindset is how people get burned. Anonymity tools exist because modern computing is hostile by default and because users lie to themselves about how careful they are. These systems are built on the assumption that the network is watching, the software is compromised until proven otherwise, and eventually you—or someone else—will fuck up. Installation and usage matter because most failures don’t happen during some Hollywood-tier hack, they happen during setup, updates, or the moment someone gets comfortable and starts cutting corners.
Tails OS
Tails is disposable by design, and you should treat it like a burner, not a home. You download the image from the official site, follow the instructions, you verify the signature because skipping verification is how you start the whole process already screwed, and you write it to a USB stick using the recommended installer. You don’t dual-boot it, you don’t install it to your internal drive, and you don’t reuse the same USB for years like it has sentimental value. When you boot, you boot directly into Tails, connect through the Tor connection assistant, and you wait until Tor is fully up before doing anything. You use the Tor Browser exactly as shipped. No random extensions, no resizing windows, no logging into anything tied to your real life because you “just needed to check something real quick.” If you enable persistent storage, you do it reluctantly and minimally, understanding that persistence is a crack in the whole amnesic model. When you’re done, you shut the system down properly and let it wipe memory. No suspend, no hibernate, no clever workarounds. Tails is not a daily driver, and the moment you try to turn it into one, you’re already using it wrong.
Qubes OS with whonix
Qubes with Whonix is for people who assume everything is hostile and want that hostility contained instead of ignored. Installation starts with hardware that actually supports it, meaning proper virtualization support and enough RAM that you’re not constantly fighting the OS. You install Qubes directly on bare metal and accept that it owns the machine completely. During setup, you enable the default Whonix components so you get a Tor gateway and workstation templates from the start. After first boot, you do not immediately jump into real activity. You learn how qubes work first, because misunderstanding how copy-paste, file transfers, and networking boundaries behave is how people quietly defeat Qubes while feeling smug about it. For anonymous activity, you create AppVMs based on the Whonix workstation template and ensure their networking is routed exclusively through the Whonix gateway qube. You do not mix anonymous and non-anonymous work in the same qube, you do not share clipboards casually, and you do not tell yourself “this one exception won’t matter.” That’s how identities bleed together. You keep separate networking qubes for non-anonymous traffic so the separation is enforced by the OS, not by your memory or self-control. You update templates regularly, because stale templates rot your security assumptions, and you treat USB devices like the malware delivery systems they often are by using dedicated USB qubes. Qubes gives you brutal, unforgiving isolation if you respect it. The second you start collapsing boundaries for convenience, you’ve turned a serious security platform into a very expensive placebo.
None of this protects you from acting like yourself online, reusing identifiers, logging into personal accounts, leaking behavioral patterns over time, or being observed in the real world. Most deanonymization doesn’t happen because Tor failed or virtualization broke, it happens because people get lazy, impatient, or overconfident. These tools remove a lot of easy ways to fuck yourself, but they don’t remove responsibility. They buy you margin, not immunity, and if you forget that, the tools won’t save you.
